Omitted-Ability Bias and the Increase in the Return to Schooling by McKinley L. Blackburn & David Neumark
NBER WORKING PAPERS SERIES
OMITTED—ABILITY BIAS ANDTHE INCREASE
IN THE RETURN TO SCHOOLING
Mckinley L. Blackburn
David Neumark
Working Paper No. 3693




The authors wish to thank John Bishop, David Card, Bill Carter,
John Chilton, Elchanari Cohn, Andrew Foster, Jacob Mincer, Paul
Taubmari, and seminar participants at the University of
Pennsylvania, the University of Maryland, and Columbia
University, for helpful comments. Sadiq Currimbhoy provided
excellent research assistance. This paper is part of NEER's
research program in Labor Studies. Any opinions expressed are
those of the authors and not those of the National Bureau of
Economic Research.NBER Working Paper p3693
May 1991
OMITTED-ABILITY BIAS AND THE INCREASE
IN THE RETURN TO SCHOOLING
ABSTRACT
Over the 1980s there were sharp increases in the return to
schooling estimated with conventional wage regressions. We use
both a signaling model and a human capital model to explore how
the relationship between ability and schooling could havechanged
over this period in ways Chat would have increased the schooling
coefficient in these regressions. Our empirical results reject
the hypothesis that an increase in the upward bias of the
schooling coefficient, due to a change in the relationship
between ability and schooling, underlies the observed increase in
the return to education over the 1980s. We also find that the
increase in the return to education has occurred largely for
workers with relatively high levels of academic ability.
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and NBERI.Introduction
In the 1980s, the United States experienced considerable changes in the
structure of wages paid to different demographic and educational groups. The
most notable of these changes is a large increase in wage differences of white
males at different educational levels, as the wages of more-educated workers
increased relative to their less-educated counterparts) For instance, among
white males between the ages of 25 and 34 in 1979, college graduates earned
roughly 15 percent more than workers who had only completed high school; among
25-34 year-olds in 1987, college graduates earned 33 percent more than
high-school graduates.2 Blackburn, Bloom, and Freeman (1990b) show that wage
differences associated with education also increased for white females, while
Katz and Revenga (1989) also point to increases in the 1980s in wage
differences associated with the level of labor market experience of white
males.
Several studies have attempted to explain why we observe an increase in
education-related wage differentials in the l9BOs. Perhaps the most
commonly-offered explanations have been associated with changes in the
relative demand for workers at different educational levels. For example, it
has been suggested that changes in international trade patterns have shifted
relative labor demand curves in favor of the more-educated. An associated
explanation singles out shifts in the industrial structure of the economy
towards service-oriented production as the important factor. However, the
available evidence suggests that these changes have at most played a minor
role in the changes in earnings differentials. There is more evidence that
1See, for example, Katz and Revenga (1989), and Blackburn, Bloom, and Freeman
(1990).
2These Statistics are taken from Table 1 of Blackburn, Bloom, and Freeman
(1990a).
1changes in the supply of workers at different educational levels have
contributed to the changes in earnings differentials, especially foryounger
white males, though the magnitude of this effect is sensitive to assumptions
about the substitutability between more- and less-educated workers.3 An
alternative explanation (discussed in Blackburn, Bloom and Freeman, l990a) is
that there are changes in the average level of productive ability of workers
in different educational classes. One reason for such a change could be
changes over time in the quality of primary and secondary education.4
There are several theories that suggest that there might be a
relationship between a worker's inherent ability (i.e., ability not affected
by acquisition of schooling) and his level of schooling. In the following
section, we discuss two such theories --asignaling model, and a hunan
capital model -- andexplore what might change over time so as to affect the
schooling-ability relationship.5 Since most empirical studies of the increase
in the return to schooling do not attempt to control for the effect of
unobserved ability on wages, any such changes in the schooling-ability
relationship could have led to changes over time in the observed return to
schooling.6 In fact, it could be that the "true"return to schooling (i.e.,
3Stapleton and Young (1988)develop a model in which changes in sizes of
entering cohorts affect the returns to higher education, because
substitutability between young and old workers is higher for low-educated than
high-educated workers.
6Blackburn, Bloom, and Freeman(l990a) rule out changes in the quality of
education as a complete explanation by noting that education-relatedearnings
differentials increased over the 1980s for older cohorts whose educational
quality could not have changed over the period. However, the fact that
differentials increased more rapidly for younger workerssuggests that this
may still be a partial explanation of increased differentials.
5Bishop (1989) suggests thatchanges in the return to schooling (ignoring
ability) may be due to varying selectivity of colleges and graduate schools,
or changes in the rewards to "credentials" per Se.
6Taubman and Wales (1972) examinechanges in the relationship between ability
and schooling over a much longer period, utilizing estimates from a wide
2the increase in earnings from one more year of schooling for a worker of a
given quality) has not changed over time, and that the observed increase in
earnings differentials is attributable to changes in the correlation between
7
schooling and ability.
We test the explanations of the apparent increased return to schooling
generated by these models. First, we test the proposition --generatedby the
signaling model -- thatchanges in the distribution of the workforce across
education classes underlie the increases in the estimated return to schooling.
We use CPS estimates of changes in returns to schooling, and changes in the
distribution of workers across education levels, coupled with parametric
assumptions about the distribution of unobserved ability, to explore the
plausibility of the signaling explanation.
Second, we consider the proposition -- generatedby the human capital
model -- that,because of changes in the relationship between ability and
schooling, the omission of ability as an independent variable in wage
equations has led to an "observed" rather than a true increase in the return
to schooling in the 1980s. Our empirical testing uses a sample of young white
males from the National Longitudinal Survey Youth Cohort. The models we
estimate take advantage of scores on several tests measuring academic (or
cognitive) and mechanical ability that are available for each individual
surveyed in the Youth Cohort data. These test scores are used as (potentially
error-prone) measures of ability in wage equations.
Our empirical findings provide little or no support for the idea that
changes in the relationship between ability and schooling in the l980s are
variety of data sets. They do not, however, relate these changes to variation
in the estimated return to schooling over time.
7Alternatively, an increase in the return to ability could lead to a spurious
increase in the estimated return to schooling.
3responsible for the increase in education-related earnings differentials.
However, we do find evidence that the increase in earnings differentials has
occurred primarily for workers with higher academic ability.
II. Theoretical Discussion of the Ability-Schooling Relationship
In this section, we consider the effect that the relationship between
omitted ability and schooling has on empirical estimates of the relationship
between education and earnings, and how changes in the ability-schooling
relationship may change the estimated relationship between education and
earnings. Our model for earnings is of the form
(1) W— + fl2A+
wherew is the log of the wage, S is an education variable, A is an ability
variable, andis an error term distributed independently of S and A.8 Since
A is not observed in the data sets used in recent studies of changes in the
return to schooling, these studies have used the simple-regression coefficient
b5 as an estimate for fl,(i.e.,they estimate [1] omitting ability from the
regression).9 The remainder of this sectiondevelops two models that show
that a changing relationship between ability and schooling could, in
principle, underlie the estimated increase in b5 that has been found by other
researchers.
First, a signaling model is developed, in which
fl2iszero because
ability is unobserved by employers. In this model,b5 reflects the combined
effect of the contribution of schooling to a worker'smarginal product, and
8Thewage equation can be thought of as the partial relation of w with S and
A, the correlation of other variables with w, S, and A having been removed.
9b5 —Cov(w,S)/s2where Cov(w,S) is the sample covariance between log wages
and schooling, ands is the sample standard deviation of schooling.
4the information that schooling contains for the employer's expectation of the
worker's ability. We show that changes in the distribution of workers
across education classes can alter this second component of bwS
Second, we develop a human capital model in which both schooling and
ability appear in the wage equation (i.e., both and in equation (1) are





where rAS is the (sample) correlation coefficient between ability and
schooling, and SAands are the (sample) standard deviations of ability and
schooling. If and rAS>O. bw5 is an upward-biased estimate of fl,. As
we discuss below, changes in the distribution of ability and/or opportunity
can lead to E(bs) changing while remains constant.
A. Signaling Model
In the signaling model of Spence (1973), high-ability workers obtain more
schooling than low-ability workers because schooling provides a signal to
employers that they have high levels of ability. Arrow (1973) has also
presented a model where education serves a screening function in sorting out
high-ability from low-ability workers. We present a simplified version of
Arrow's model to study the potential importance to earnings differentials of
sorting of workers into educational classes on the basis of their productive
ability.
We make four simplifying assumptions about the screening process
associated with education. First, the schooling decision is dichotomous; S is
a dummy variable equal to one if a worker is in the "high" education class,
5and zero if he is in the "low' education class.'0 Second, the single
equilibrium involves education sorting workers perfectly on the basis of
ability such that if A.>A then S.—l, and if A.A then S.—0. Third, ability 1 C 1 1 c 1
is completely unobservable while schooling is observable, so that in
equation (1) is zero. And, fourth, employers pay log wages equal to
E(MP.IS). where MP. is the log of the marginal product of worker
If MP is a linear function of schooling and ability,
(3)MPi —-y1S+
then,













where f() and F(.) are the density and distribution functions for ability,
10For example, S might be adummy variable for whether or not the worker has a
high school education or better.
"The assumption thatemployers equate log wages with the E(MPiIsj) is made to
ease the computational burden of the simulations that follow. It does imply
that firms are risk-averse in their assessment of a worker's ability.
6equation (14) can be expressed
(5)E(MPIS) —rlSi
+ + i2(A -AL)Si
If equation (5), plus a stochastic error term, determines the wage, then the
expected value of the coefficient estimate obtained from the regression of w
on S is
(6)E(bs) —'l+ '2H- AL)
It follows that the usual estimate b5 provides an upward-biased estimate of
the contribution of schooling to the actual marginal product.12
The estimated partial effect of schooling on wages can change without
changes in the direct effect of schooling on productivity (i.e., y1). In
fact, increases in the educational attainment of a population can cause E(bs)
to change, since a fall in A will affect (AH -AL).
Is it possible that such
a scenario underlies the increase in the return to schooling in the 1980s? In
general, it is not possible to determine how (AH -AL)
will vary with declines
in A.13 For instance, if the distribution of ability is uniform with finite
121fl terms of the population counterparts to the sample statistics that
contribute to the bias in equation (2), we have c—p(l-p) and AS
1/2
[p(1.p)] (A.HAL)/ °A where p is the percentage of the population in the
high-education category. Note that both and AS change when A changes,
while does not change.
t3From our expressions for the conditional means of A, we can obtain




the sign of which is indeterminate.
7bounds, then it can be shown that (A14AL) does not depend on A. However,
other distributions for ability do generate a difference between the
conditional means that varies as the percentage of workers in the
high-education class changes. In particular, we consider two single-peaked
symmetric densities for ability -- thestandard normal distribution, and a
triangular distribution with density
—1-Al if
—o otherwise
With both distributions, the difference between the conditional means of
ability is at a minimum when A—U, i.e., p..P(A￿A)_O.5)4 If p<.5, so that
more-educated workers are a minority, then the difference falls as
more-educated workers become more numerous; but once more-educated workers
become a majority, the difference begins to increase again.15 The changes in
the difference are not small; e.g., going from p—.5 to p—.66 would increase
the difference between the conditional means by 13 percent if ability followed
the standard normal distribution.
However, studies of the education-earnings relationship generally study
more than a simple two-way breakdown of the education distribution. While the
14Numerical simulations revealed that if A follows an exponential distribution,
the differential will follow a U-shaped pattern with respect to Ac However,
the minimum differential is reached at the mean of A, which is greater than
the median.
15Let A(A) —E(AIA>A).For any symmetric distribution centered at zero,
E(AIA￿A) —-E(A$A>-A)—-A(-A),so that For
the standard normal distribution, A' (A)>O and A'' (A)>O (see Heckisan and
Honore, 1990); in this case the differential will increase with increases in
A when A >0 [since A' (A )>A' (-A )]andwill decrease with increases in A
when A<0. We were unable to sign A'' (Ac) for the triangular distribution;
however, numerical calculations showed that the differential was also
U-shaped, with a minimum at Ac_OS
8restriction to equal logarithmic changes in earnings per year of schooling is
the most common empirical restriction, some studies have also used dummy
variables for various educational classes. For example, Blackburn, Bloom, and
Freeman (1990a) compare the earnings of workers who had less than a
high-school education to those with a high-school education, and to those with
a college education. Their findings (for white males aged 25-64 in the U.S.
in 1973. 1979, and 1987) are reproduced in panel A of Table 1. Their results
show only small changes in these differentials from 1973 to 1979, but much
larger changes from 1979 to 1987.
Can changes in the percentage of workers in these various classes explain
the observed movements in earnings differentials? Changes in educational
attainment were considerable for white males over this period. For example,
the percentage of working males 25-64 with less than a high-school education
fell from .26 to .13 from 1973 to 1987, while the percent with a college
degree increased from .21 to .32. Assuming that education perfectly sorts
workers by ability and that the distribution of ability remains unchanged, and
choosing a parametric distribution for ability, it is possible to predict how
the observed changes in the percentage of workers in the various classes would
affect the earnings differentials between these classes. These results are
reported in the bottom two panels of Tablei).6 For both the standard normal
16These simulations are based on an extreme version of the signaling model in
which in equation (3) is set to zero. The simulated earnings differentials
are determined only up to a constant factor of proportionality. The
coefficient on ability, T2 was standardized so that the college graduate to
less than high school earnings differential In 1973 was the same in the actual
and simulated numbers. Using this coefficient, the actual and simulated
earnings differences in 1973 are very close for the college to high school
graduate comparison. This experiment may overstate the effect of changes in
the ability differentials between different educational classes, because the
entire earnings differential is attributed to ability.
9and triangular distributions, the results suggest that only a small part of
the change in differentials over the 1979-1987 period might be explained by
changes in educational attainment.'7
Of course, the screening model formulation permits other reasons for the
bias associated with using bs to change over time, including a change in the
sorting process of education (e.g. ,ifeducation becomes a better filter over
time), increases in the dispersion of ability, or an increase in the return to
ability.
B.liuman Capital Model
In the human-capital model of the relationship between schooling and
earnings offered by Mincer (1974, Ch. 1), all workers have identical
opportunities for, and receive identical rewards from, human-capital
investments. In contrast, a model suggested by Becker (1975) allows ability
to affect the rate of return to human capital investment, as he assumes that
workers with higher levels of innate ability will also receive higher returns
to their human capital.18 Following Becker, we assume that for each
individual the marginal benefit and marginal cost of education take the form
MB(A.,S.) —exp(kA.)S
17
Jacob Mincer points out that the screening model suggests that the earnings
of college graduates relative to all other workers should be falling over the
1973-1987 period, since college graduates were a growing minority
(among 25-64 year-olds) throughout this period. While this differential did
fall from 1973 to 1979, it increased from 1979 to 1987.
The simulations were also performed for changes in educational attainment
for 25-34 year-old white males. Since there was almost no change in
educational attainment for this group over the years 1979-1987, these results
provide even less support for the importance of signaling explanations for
the change in earnings differentials.
18The model is discussed in his Woytinsky Lecture of 1967, which is reprinted
in Becker (1975).
10KC(P1,S1) —exp(-P)S
where P1representsthe ith individual's opportunities for investing in human
capital.19 Assuming thatb<d,the optimal level of investment in schooling is
equal to
(7) S —exP[(ii+Pi)/(d-b)1
sothat workers with higher ability (or higher opportunity) will invest more
*
'-S






This form for the wage equation shows that if ability is held constant, then
the empirical relationship between w and S reflects the (logarithmic) slope
of the marginal benefit function for schooling.20 However, if ability is
19 . Asimilar framework is used in Behrman, Pollak, and Taubman (1990). We
assume that benefits and costs are expressed in constant per-periodflows
corresponding to the period for which the wage or income variable ismeasured.
2°It is not possible, in this framework, to derive a marginal benefit function
for schooling that leads to the commonly-used semi-log specification for the
wage equation. To see this, note that the expressionfor W. would have to be
W.—exp(f+gS+hA1)




But this marginal benefit function, when integrated from 0 to S, does not
yield the required form for W.. At the least, this suggeststhat one should
try more than one specification in estimating theeffects of schooling on
wages. Because we do not use log schooling, we do not imposethe restriction
in equation (8) that the negative of the log of the intercept is equal tothe
schooling coefficient.
11omitted, a positive correlation between S and A would lead to the estimated
return to schooling tending to overstate the marginal benefit of schooling, as
those workers with higher levels of observed schooling will also be those with
higher marginal benefits of education.




is the covariance of ability and opportunity. If ability and
opportunity are uncorrelated, or positively correlated, the covariance between
log schooling and ability is positive, and the omission of ability from wage
equations should lead to upward-biased estimates of the return to schooling.
However, if A and P are negatively correlated, the sign of the covariance is
not clear. Since opportunity represents anything that shifts the marginal
cost curve for schooling, and since high-ability individuals are likely to
face high foregone-earnings costs at the margin, P and A may be negatively
correlated. In particular, if we allow wages to be a direct determinant of




In terms of the earlier expression for marginal cost, d—(l+b) and




is still indeterminate. If more able individuals have lower costs of
education, net of opportunity-wage costs (as seems most plausible), the
covariance between ability and log schooling will be positive, and the OLS
schooling coefficient estimate will be an upward-biased estimate of the
12marginal benefit of education.21
The human-capital model suggests an interesting result for how changes in
the distribution of opportunity will affect the bias in schooling
coefficients. Assuming ability and opportunity are uncorrelated, an increase
in the variation of marginal costs across individuals (i.e., an increase in
a) should increase the variance of log schooling, but have no effect on the
correlation between ability and log schooling.22 From equation (2), it follows
that the bias in the schooling coefficient (using the logarithm of schooling
rather than the level of schooling as the independent variable) will fall as a
result of the increase in the variation of opportunity. The intuition is that
with higher variation in opportunity a smaller part of observed differences in
schooling are due to differences in ability. Increases in the variance of
ability will increase both the variance of schooling and the covariance
between ability and schooling, but the net effect is that the bias in the
schooling coefficient will increase.23 Not surprisingly, increases in k -- the
21Strictly speaking, this discussion implies that if we controlled for ability,
the schooling coefficient would be unbiased. However, if the ability controls
are imperfect, or if there is measurement error in the schooling variable,
then the schooling coefficient may remain biased once ability is included.
Griliches and Mason (1972) argue that measurement error in the schooling
variable should lead to a downward bias in the schooling coefficient once
ability is included as a regressor.
22The variance of schooling can, from (7), be expressed as
2 f22 2
a * — ika+a
log(S (d-b)2 L
A P
if ability and opportunity are independent.
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13return to ability in this model -- willincrease the bias in the usual
schooling coefficient estimate (though it will also increase the variance of
schooling, and the covariance between schooling and ability).24 Finally,
increases in the "true" marginal benefit of schooling (i.e.,b)will increase
the usual schooling coefficient estimate. However, the increase in the
estimate will be less than the increase in b, because the bias in the
schooling coefficient falls as b increases.25
The conclusions reached in the previous paragraph follow under the
assumption that ability and opportunity are uncorrelated. However, if we
assume that wages directly affect MC, as in equation (10), and we assume
0A<0
the results of the previous paragraph are essentially unchanged. The
one exception is that changes in b will no longer affect the bias in the
schooling coefficient. A summary of the effects of changes in the
human-capital parameters on the bias in b is provided in Table 2.
The human capital model offers several ways in which the observed
wage/schooling relationship may change without there being changes in the
"true" effect of schooling on wages. Of course, the extent to which the joint
2
which increases with increases in
24For example, Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1990) have suggested that recent
increases in the residual variance in wage equations for males reflect
increases in the returns to ability. If so, one consequence could be that
observed increases in the return to schooling overstate true increases in




sothat the usual coefficient estimate will increase when b increases.
14distribution of schooling and ability may have changed over the l980s is en
empirical question. In the following section, we estimatemodels that attempt
to control for the effects of ability on wages in order to ascertainthe




The data we use come from the National Longitudinal Survey Youth Cohort.
This cohort was first surveyed in 1979, when the respondents were betweenthe
ages of 14 and 22. They have beenreinterviewed each year since 1979; we use
data through the 1987 interview. The information extracted foreach year
includes wages on the current job, schooling status, labor market activity
over the previous year, and industry, occupation, and union coverage onthe
current job. The 1979 interview also collected severalvariables associated
with the family background of the respondent, which we use in our empirical
analysis.
Most importantly, the data set includes scores of each respondent onthe
Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) tests. Ten test scoresare
available, for a variety of cognitive and mechanical aptitudes.The test
areas are: general science; arithmetic reasoning;mathematics knowledge; word
knowledge; paragraph comprehension: mechanical comprehension;numerical
operations; electronic information; auto and shop information;and coding
speed. The ASVAB tests were administered to all survey respondentsbetween
the 1979 and 1980 surveys, with a 94 percent completion rate.The
availability of these test scores, along with the time period overwhich the
data were collected, make the NLS Youth Cohort a useful data setfor studying
changes in education-related earnings differentialsfor young white males in
15the early 1980s, and whether shifts in the ability-schooling relationship
underlie these changes.26
There is more than one manner in which the NLSY data could be used to
measure earnings differentials for young workers. One possibility is to
estimate wage equations for each year from 1979 to 1987, using any respondent
in the year who was working and was not in school.27 One problem with this
type of analysis is that the sample in the later years will be increasingly
made up of workers more established in their labor market positions; signaling
and learning models suggest that schooling may become less important for
wages, and ability more important, as workers accumulate experience,28 so that
this analysis could confuse age (actually, experience) effects in the return
to schooling with the desired period effects. To minimize this problem, we
instead construct our sample so that we use only one wage for each respondent;
the wage we choose is the first wage available after the respondent has
completed his schooling (i.e., the respondent does not return to school by the
1987 wave of the survey). With this sample, we hope to capture the schooling
effects among workers competing for their first jobs, for it is among this
group that the effects of relative demand and supply shifts should be most
important. However, the restriction to using only one wage per respondent
makes it impractical to try to carry out an analysis of bias in schooling
26The NLS Youth Cohort has also not suffered fromsample attrition to the same
degree as earlier longitudinal labor-market surveys; by 1987, roughly 90
percent of the original cohort was still responding to interview requests.
27Bishop (1989) uses a restricted version of thissetup, in which coefficients
in wage equations are allowed to vary along a linear trend over the sample
period. Also, he does not restrict the sample to individuals who are out of
school.
28See, e.g., Harris and Holmstrom (1982) and Farber and Gibbons (1990).
Indeed, Farber and Gibbons derive a further restriction that returns to
ability will increase with experience, while returns to schooling will remain
constant.
16coefficients in regressions estimated separately for each year from 1979 to
1987, so we allow our schooling coefficients to vary along a linear time trend
over the 1979-1987 period.29
Sample means and standard deviations for many of the variables used in
our wage-equation estimation are presented in the first column of Table 3.
The average age of our sample of workers on their first post-schooling job is
fairly young, though the amount of labor-market experience (i.e., hours worked
in year-equivalent units) shows that on average our respondents had worked
over 2 years before they enter the sample.3° The educational-attainment
statistics for our sample show slightly lower average education levels than
other estimates for this cohort, largely due to the fact that some of the
eventually more-educated members of this cohort are still in school in 1987.
In column (2) of Table 3, we report coefficient estimates from an
individual-level regression of some of the variables on a constant and a time
trend. These estimates show how the composition of the sample changes as we
move through the 1979-1987 period. The wage variable we use is a measure of
hourly earnings (in current dollars) on the primary job held at the time of
the interview; the trend coefficient shows that this wage has increased by
almost 8 percent per year over the 1979-1987 period. While part of this
increase is due to inflation, the increase also reflects the fact that the
individuals in the later years have a higher average level of education, have
more experience at the time of the first post-schooling job observation, and
are older at the time of the first job. Wages in the later years may also be
290ur sample size for white males is 2451. We exclude the self-employed, farm
laborers, and respondents reporting a wage lower than one-half of the federal
minimum wage prevailing in the year from which the observation is drawn.
300f course, much of this experience may have been obtained in jobs held while
still in school.
17higher because returns to education (and experience) increased over the
period.
Table 3 also reports sample Statistics for averages of three subsets of
the ASVAB test scores. Since the individuals in the cohort were of different
ages when the tests were administered, age effects were removed from the
scores by regressing each of the individual (normalized) test scores on a set
of individual-year age dummies. The residuals from selected tests were then
averaged to form the three composite test scores identified in Table 3.
Following Bishop (1989), we dropped the coding speed test, and classified the
remaining tests as either academic, technical, or computational; details of
this classification are provided in the footnotes to the table. As our
wage-equation estimates suggest that the technical and computational
composites have very similar effects on wages, we also present sample
statistics for the sum of these two composites (i.e., the non-academic test).
The trend coefficients for the test scores show that all three composites tend
to be higher for those individuals whose first jobs were in the later years,
with the increase over time largest for the academic test and smallest for the
technical test.
B. Equation Estimates
Using our hourly wage variable, we initially estimate equations of the
form
(11) log(w) —flS.+fl2(T.S.) + $3X. + fi4(T.X.) + 5Y. +
where w is the wage, S is years of schooling, T is the value of the time trend
for the year in which the observation is taken, X is a vector of other factors
that affect the wage, Y is a set of year dummies, and c is an error term. The
trend has a value of zero for the first year (1979), and increases by one for
18each following year. Including year dununies effectively controls for
variation in wages due to inflation, productivity growth, or other cyclical
factors. The other variables included in X are experience, age, a union
membership dummy, a marriage dummy, and an urban dummy; the estimated trends
in the coefficients for the marriage dummy and the urban dummy were
essentially zero, so in our reported estimates we constrained these trends to
be zero.
Ordinary least-squares estimates of and in equation (11) are
reported in column (1) of Table 4. The results replicate the increased return
to schooling in this period found in other datasets.31 The estimates suggest
that the linear return to schooling was .032 in 1979, and that this
coefficient has increased by .0034 in each following year; by 1987, the
estimate for the return to schooling is .059. This estimate for the increase
in the return to schooling is somewhat larger than estimates suggested by
previous studies, though other studies have used samples of workers that are
older and more established than the workers in our sample.32
To further explore the robustness of the increased return to schooling in
the NLSY, in the remaining columns of Table 4 we include other
31We also estimated separate wage equations for each year, using our sample of










32While we do not focus on these coefficients in this paper, the OLS estimates
show the coefficients for age and union membership to have declined over time,
while the coefficient for experience increased.
19education-related variables as regressors to pick up nonlinear effects, while
continuing to interact the years-of-education variable with a time trend. The
linear specification could lead to incorrect inferences concerning the sign or
magnitude of the increase in the return to schooling if the true relationship
between schooling and log wages is nonlinear.33 This is potentially a serious
problem in analyzing our sample, since the individuals whose first jobs are
from the earlier years tend to be less educated than the individuals from the
later years. For example, if the return to schooling were higher for college
than high school, our finding that the return to schooling is higher in the
later years studied could entirely be due to the fact that individuals from
the later years have more years of college education.
In column (2) of Table 4, we add years of college as an additional
regressor; the estimates suggest the return to college years is higher than to
pre-college years, but including this variable only marginally reduces the
years-of-education coefficient trend. Including years of high school along
with years of college (column 3) reduces the education-coefficient trend by
considerably more (though it provides an unlikely negative coefficient for
high-school years). In column (4) we include a college graduate dummy, and in
column (5) we include both a high-school graduate and a college graduate
dwnmy; estimates of both specifications continue to provide evidence of an
increasing return to schooling. In sum, nonlinear effects of schooling on log
wages, combined with the nature of our sample, may explain some of the large
increase in the return to schooling suggested in column (1), but even after
330ne possible nonlinear relationship betweenwages and schooling is the
log-linear model for wages suggested in section II. Empirical results using
the log of schooling in place of the level of schooling in our wage-equation
estimations uniformly provided poorer fits, so we continued to use the level
of schooling. Conclusions about the trend in the education coefficient,
however, were very similar for both schooling specifications.
20controlling for these effects we continue to see a reasonably large rise in
the schooling coefficient.
As discussed in Section II, all of the schooling coefficient estimates in
Table 4, and in particular the years-of-education coefficient trend,
potentially suffer from biases resulting from the error term being partly
composed of individual abilities not captured in X, and from changes in the
correlations between these abilities and schooling. In Table 5, we attempt to
provide some idea of the importance of omitted-ability bias by including our
test score measures as proxies for this omitted ability. In column (1) we
include the individuals academic, technical, and computational test scores as
independent variables. As the coefficient estimates for the technical and
computational tests are very close, and the coefficient estimate for the
academic test is negative and statistically insignificant, we estimated a
specification that excludes the academic test, and includes the sum of the
technical and computational tests; these results are in column (2). Both
regressions provide highly significant coefficient estimates for the
non-academic test scores, and inclusion of the test scores reduces the
estimates for the schooling coefficient at any point in time (e.g. ,incolumn
(1) the coefficient estimate for 1979 is .013, and for 1987 it is .051).
However, the magnitude of the estimated increase in the schooling coefficient
does not decline after including the test scores, but rather slightly
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increases.
Simply including the test scores as regressors may not be the best way to
use the information in these variables to control for "ability." It seems
result is due to the fact that, in our data set, the partial
regression coefficient in the auxiliary regression of ability on schooling
displays a (statistically significant) negative trend for each of the
individual and composite test scores that we use.
21reasonable to expect that the productive ability that employers value is at
least partly reflected in our test scores but that several other factors also
affect the outcome of the tests (e.g.. test-taking ability, sleep the previous
night, etc.). We might write this process as
TS —1A.+u.
j 1 1
whereTS is the test score, A is ability rewarded in the labor market, and u
is other factors that affect the test score. If we assume that A and u are
uncorrelated, we have the classical errors-in-variables setup, suggesting that
Table 5's OLS estimates of the test score coefficients, and coefficients for
variables correlated with the test scores, are inconsistent. As a remedy, we
assume that ability is correlated with the family background of the individual
through the equation
A —Fi+
whereF is a vector of family-background variables.35 Instrumental-variable
estimation of the wage equation when the test score is included as a
regressor, using F as an instrument for TS, should eliminate the inconsistency
in the wage-equation estimates resulting from measurement error in the test
36
scores.
35We assume that F and u are uncorrelated. Prior research suggests that it is
reasonable to exclude family-background variables as regressors in a wage
equation (see the discussion in Blackburn and Neumark, forthcoming). Note
that equations (7) and (8) imply that variables that determine P are obvious
Instruments for schooling, but not necessarily for test scores. While family
background may seem most directly related to P, family-background variables
may also be highly correlated with TS (and especially if Ai is directly
determined by these variables).
36Thjs method for controlling for unobserved ability was originally suggested
by Griliches and Mason (1972); see also the surveys in Griliches (1977, 1979).
22Schooling and test-score coefficient estimates from an estimation in
which the test scores are treated as error-ridden are presented in columns (3)
and (4) of Table 5. The family-background variables used as instruments are
listed in the appendix table, along with the coefficient estimates in the
first-stage regressions for the test scores.37 The wage-equation estimates
show the estimate of the "ability" effect to be larger than without
instrumenting, as would usually be expected if the OLS coefficients suffered
from measurement-error bias. The schooling coefficients also decline, for any
given year, and appear to be essentially zero in the earliest years. But the
increase in the return to schooling is slightly larger as a result of
instrumenting for the test scores, again suggesting that omitted ability plays
no role in explaining increases in the return to schooling. We also performed
specification tests (suggested by Hausrnan, 1978) for the presence of
measurement-error bias in the ability coefficient; the probability values for
the null hypothesis of no measurement-error bias are also reported in Table 5.
The specification tests actually suggest that instrumenting is not necessary
for the test scores.
Our instrumental-variable estimates may also be inconsistent if the level
of schooling is not exogenous with respect to the post-schooling wage. Models
in which schooling decisions depend upon the wage (such as the human-capital
model of section II, with a fixed effect in the wage-equation error not
captured by the test scores), or measurement error in the schooling variable
37For observations in which a family-background variable is missing, we set the
variable to zero; we also include dummy variables for each family-background
variable being missing. This is essentially a first-order regression method
for handling missing regressors. This method is likely to provide
inconsistent coefficient estimates (see Kmenta, 1986), so the coefficient
estimates we report in the appendix table are likely biased estimates of A.
However, the inconsistency in these estimates should not affect the
consistency of our estimates of the wage equation.
23(Criliches and Mason, 1972), suggest that schooling should be treated as
potentially correlated with the wage-equation error. Given the young age of
our sample, endogeneity is a potentially serious problem, since the wages we
observe are likely highly correlated with those relevant to their schooling
decisions. To explore this possibility, we use our family-background
variables to instrument for both the non-academic test score and education;
these results are reported in column (5) of Table538 This technique does
affect the point estimates for the schooling and ability coefficients, but it
also leads to a considerable increase in the standard errors associated with
these coefficients; the increase in the return to schooling implied by the
point estimates is even larger. If we instrument for schooling but not the
test scores (column 6), we find similar results to those in column (5).
Hausman tests provide no support for the joint hypothesis of endogeneity (or
measurement error) in schooling and measurement error in ability, or for the
simple hypothesis that schooling is endogenous or measured with error.
We were concerned that our results may be partially driven by the failure
to adequately control for interactive effects among the determinants of the
wage. For instance, there may be an interaction between education and ability
in wage equations, e.g., education may have a larger impact on the wages of
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more able workers. This may be particularly important given that, in our
sample, individuals observed in the later years have both higher test scores
38Rather than instrumenting for the education/trend interaction, we used
the first-stage predicted value for education and interacted it with the trend
variable in estimating the wage equation, since there is no reason to expect
the trend variable to be correlated with the error term.





The first column of Table 6 presents estimates for the specification in
the second column of Table 5 with an interaction between schooling and
non-academic ability as a regressor.40 The education/ability coefficient
estimate is statistically significant, and the education/trend coefficient
estimate is reduced considerably. This result suggests that our finding of an
increase in the return to schooling may be partly due to a combination of an
ability/education interactive effect and the fact that average levels of
ability are increasing over time in our sample. However, the estimates in
columns (2) and (3) suggest that this interactive effect is much less
important if we allow the education/non-academic-test coefficient to vary over
time, and also add interactions of the non-academic test score with age,
experience and a trend. For example, in column (3) the education coefficient
estimate still displays an upward (although statistically insignificant)
trend, though there is also some (slight) evidence that the
education/non-academic-test coefficient is increasing over time.
It is perhaps not surprising that there appears to be little evidence of
an interactive effect of education and non-academic ability, since there is no
clear reason why non-academic ability would be expected to increase the
beneficial effects of education. In columns (4)-(6) of Table 6, we repeat the
estimations of columns (l)-(3) using the academic test score in place of the
non-academic. Including an interaction between the academic test and
40We estimated these specifications by OLS using the test scores as ability
measures. This method of estimation is supported by the insignificant Hausman
test statistics of Table S when using the test scores. Using different data,
Blackburn and Neumark (forthcoming) found that instrumenting was necessary
when using an IQ test score; the difference in findings may be due to the
ASVAB test scores being less error-prone than the IQ test scores in the other
data.
25education provides a significant coefficient estimate for the interaction, and
leaves the estimated increase in the schooling coefficient at essentially
zero. This interactive effect of academic ability and schooling appearsto
primarily be present in the later years of our sample, as the
test-score/education trend coefficient is significant in columns (5) and (6).
If we include all interactions for both the academic and non-academic test
scores in the same equation (column 7), the academic-test/educationtrend
coefficient estimate is still large, but becomes statistically insignificant
because of a much higher standard error. In column (8), we exclude all
variables with clearly insignificant coefficient estimates, leaving the
academic-test/education trend coefficient estimate virtually unchanged but
with a much smaller standard error. While any hypothesis testing associated
with column (8) does suffer from pretest bias, the t-statistic of 2.9 is
rather large. In addition, in both columns (7) and (8), an estimated increase
in the coefficient on education is no longer present.
To summarize the findings from Tables 5 and 6, the increase in the return
to education over the l980s persists when account is taken of the potential
relationships between ability, schooling and wages. However, our
investigation leads to a refinement of the finding: the increase in the
return to education occurred for workers with relatively high academic
ability. Existing estimates of the increase in the return to schooling, from
data sets without ability measures, overstate the relative wage gains that
education would have imparted to a randomly chosen (or marginal) worker.
Several checks of the robustness of our findings to changes in the sample
used in estimating the wage equation were performed, and the results are
reported in Table 7. The first two columns report the OLS estimate of the
education coefficient and its trend in specifications without ability
26controls. The next two columns report these coefficients' estimates from
specifications that include the test-score interactions included in column (8)
of Table 6. We also report the academic-test/education trend coefficient
estimate, and the estimate for the coefficient on the non-academic test score.
We tried two alternative restrictions in selecting the sample. First, we
excluded any individual with labor market experience greater than three years,
to avoid using individuals who may be firmly ensconced in the labor force and
therefore not competing for a new job, and to reduce the potential confounding
influence of learning. Second, we excluded observations whose first job
observations were in 1982 or 1983, to enhance the comparison between the low
schooling-return and high schooling-return periods, and to eliminate severe
recession years. Both redefinitions of the sample lead to similar conclusions
as with the full sample, with the sample with the maximum-experience
restriction providing a larger estimated increase in the
academic-test/education interaction effect than was provided by the full
sample. The fourth row of Table 7 presents results from estimations that
include a college graduation dummy; again, conclusions are essentially
unchanged.
We also estimated wage equations that include twelve industry and eleven
occupation dummies as regressors; these results are reported in the bottom
three rows of Table 7. These estimates suggest that occupational shifts (but
not industry shifts) can explain a considerable portion of the schooling
return increase if we omit ability from the specifications.41 Occupation (and
to a lesser extent industry) shifts also appear to account for at least part
findings differs from that of Blackburn, Bloom, and Freeman (l990a), who
found that changing industrial composition of employment explains up to 25
percent of the increase in education-related earnings differentials, but that
occupational changes played no role in the schooling-return increase.
27of the increase in the interactive effect of academic ability and education,
suggesting that at least part of the increased importance of education to
wages for high academic-ability males is due to demand shifts towards
occupations (and industries) that tend to employ high-education/high-ability
individuals.
IV.Summary
Much attention has been paid to explaining recent increases in the return
to schooling among males in the U.S. Estimates of these increases are
generally obtained from wage regressions that are potentially biased by the
presence of "unobserved" ability in the wage-equation error. We have shown
that both a signaling model and a human capital model suggest that changes in
the relationship between ability and schooling could underlie the increases in
the schooling return. We offer evidence on the plausibility of these
explanations, with a particular focus on using test scores as a proxy for
ability in wage regressions. Our results provide little or no support in
favor of the hypothesis that the increases in the return to schooling reflect
an increased upward bias in the schooling coefficient estimate due to a change
in the ability-schooling relationship. But our results do provide an
interesting refinement of the stylized fact that education returns have been
increasing in the l98Os -- theincrease in the return to education has
occurred largely for workers with higher levels of "academic" ability.
What can explain an increase in the return to education for high-ability
workers only? Supply-side explanations can be constructed. For example, if
it were the case that education and ability were becoming less correlated over
time, then there would be relatively fewer of those workers with both high
levels of education and ability; also, if the average level of ability were to
28fall, this could create a growing scarcity of high-education, high-ability
workers. But at present it is difficult to assess the existence or importance
of such supply-side changes.42 While occupation shifts appear to be of some
importance, what is causing these shifts is still an open question.
Skill-biased technical change is one possibility, though the evidence in favor
of this argument is still limited.43
fact. Bishop (1989) refers to results that suggest that average test
scores of young individuals were increasing over the l980s.
43Davis and Haltiwanger (1990) offer evidence on changes in wage dispersion
across manufacturing plants that, they argue, supports the skill-biased
technical change hypothesis.
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CC to LTHS .47 .46 .63 - .01 .17
US to LTHS .19 .20 .25 .01 .05
CC to US .28 .26 .38 - .02 .12
B:Standard Normal
CC to LTHS .47 .48 .50 .01 .02
HS to LTHS .20 .20 .20 0 0
CC to US .27 .28 .30 .01 .02
C:Triangular
CC to LTHS .47 .47 .49 0 .02
US to LTHS .20 .19 .19 - .01 0
CC to US .27 .28 .30 .01 .02
*These numbers are taken from Table 1 in Blackburn, Bloom, and Freeman
(1990a), and refer to workers aged 25-64. CC refers to college graduates,
US to high school graduates, and LTHS to workers with less than a high
school degree.Table 2
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Non-academic test .000 .184
(technical•cjtetlon.L) (1.541) (.012)
(—.91,1.161
1. Coefficient from regression on intercept andtimetrend. The timetrendis definedas zeroin 1979.
Standard error, reportedin parentheses.
2.Residuals from regressions ofnormalized testscores on individualyearage duiriy variables. Lower and .ç'per
quartilesarereported insquare brackets.
3. Average of residuals for tests of arithmetic, mathematics, word knowledge.par.grapflcoeprehension,and
general science.












































•. . .. .. .080 .075
(.024)(.025)
.393 .393 .394 .396 .396
1. Specifications .(so inc1ie experience. age and LWOfl status(each interacted with a time trend defined as
zero in 1979), dirrvy variables for urban residence and married, spouse present, and an intercept and iingte year
dumvyvsrlsbles. Standarderrorsare reported inparentheses.Table 5
OLS and IV Log Wage Equation Estirates,
Including Test Scores with Constant Coefficients'
IV for V for Test Scores IV for
OLS Test Scores and Schooling Schooling
(2)
Yearsof education .013 .012 -.000 -.001 .031 .020
(.008)(.008)(.013) (.013) (.035) (.016)
Years of education .0048 .0048 .0062 .0057 .0064 .0095













p-value2 ...... .331 .170 .418 .136
1. Specifications also incIeexperience, ageand .riionstatus(each interacted witha time trenddetinedas
iero in 1979), duitny variables for urban residence and married,spouse present,and an intercept and singLe year
&,miy variables. Standard errors are reportedInparentheses. Instrunental variables are listed in Table Al.
2. P-value from Ftest of significance of coefficients of residuals from first-stage instrunentatvariables
regressions, In log wage equationestimatedwith OLS.Table 6
OLS Log Wage Equation Estimates,
Alternative Trend and Interactive Specifications'
1fl iL LL LL L LZL L
Years ofeducanon .026 .025 .019 .031 .029 .025 .025 .023
(.009)(.009)(.009)(.009)(.009)(.009)(.009)(.009)
Yearsof education .0015 .0015 .0022 .0001 -.0003-.0001-.0003.0004
xtrend (.0018) (.0018) (.0019) (.0019) (.0020) (.0021) (.0021) (.0020)
Non-acaoemic test .038 .036 .052 ... ...... .067 .061
(.006)(.006)(.009) (.0)6)(.012)
Non-academic test .009 .006 .002...... •.. .005
xyears 0feducation (.002)(.003)(.004) (.007)
Non-academic test ... .0008.0010......... - .0005
K yearsofeducation (.0008) (.0008) (.0015)
K trend
Non-academic test ...... -.0041... ... ... .0057 -.0037
xtrend (.0028) (.0050) (.0027)
Non-academic test ..... - .005... ... ... . .002
K experience (.004) (.006)
Non-academic test ... .. .010........ .006 .006
xage (.003) (.005)(.003)
Academic test ........ .048 .043 .058-043 -.021
(.011)(.012)(.020)(.032)(.017)
Academic test ........ .015 .005 ..003-.004
5 years of education (.004)(.007)(.007)(.014)
Academic test .. ... ... ... .0029 .0032 .0034.0029
x years of education (.0014) (.0015) (.0028) (.0010)
xtrend
Academic test ... ... ... .. ... - .0022.0068
xtrend (.0054) (.0094)
Academic test ... ........ ... -.012-.007
K experience (.007)(.011)
Academic test ... ... ........ .019 .009 .009
K age (.005)(.009)(.007)
.409 .409 .411 .402 .403 .405 .413 .414
1.Specificationsalso inc1ue experience, age and i,iion status (eachinteracted with a timetrend defined as
zeroin 1979), ôjmiy variablesfor urbanresidence and married, spouse present, and n intercept and single year
ó.rmiyvariables.Standarderrorsare reportedin parentheses.Table 7
Schooling and Schooling x Ability CoefficienteandTrend lnteractione
for Alternative Samplee and SpecificatiOn&















Table 4 (1) T.ble 6 (8) Tr
.032 .0034 .023 .0004
(.007)(.0017)(.009)(.0020)
.03.4 .0041 .027 .0008
(.008)(.0020)(.009)(.0024)
.030 .003.6 .018 .0009
(.006)(.0017)(.009)(.0021)
.028 .0027 .018 .0001
(.008) (.0017>(.009)(.0020)
.038 .0033 .028 .0009
(.007)(.0016)(.009)(.00)9>



























Tears of tducation coefficients Tearsof eó..cationac.deeic ion-ac.desslctest
_____________________________________ test trend coefficient score coefticent
On.edfgit Ins6.etry and .032 .0016 .022 .0003
occs.çatlon siy variabLes (.007)(.0016)(.008)(.0019)
included(5.2297)







Coefficients of Instrumental Variables in First—stage Regressions'
(fl (2) (3)
Non-Academic Test2 Academic Test2Schooling
Magazines in .231 .149 .484
home (age 14) (.060) (.030) (.073)
Newspapers in .311 .108 .152
home (age 14) (.077) (.038) (.095)
Library card in .067 .076 .145
home (age 14) (.061) (.030) (.075)
Father's education .029 .015 .080
(1979) (.010) (.005) (.012)
Mother's education .072 .036 .094
(1979) (.013) (.006) (.016)
Number of siblings—.047 —.037 —.151
(1979) (.019) (.010) (.022)
Number of older .015 .015 .086
siblings (1979) (.024) (.012) (.029)
Highest grade of .029 .012 .105
oldest sibling (.014) (.007) (.017)
(1979)
Foreign language .011 —.052 .177
spoken in home (.082) (.041) (.100)
(age 14)
Father and mother -.062 -.029 .387
in home (age 14) (.082) (.040) (.100)
No adult male —.024 —.021 .187
in home (age 14) (.106) (.052) (.130)
.368 .502 .625
1. Coefficients.rcreportedforfirst-stage regressions usinglinearschooLing. Specifications also 1ncLt.e
intercepts.singleyear dutrtyvariables,.11other variables 4ncltsed In specifications of wage equationsIn
T.ble 2,aM druv variablesfor eachofthese set equal to one when data were missing on the instrr*ntS(In
whichcasethe variablesweresetequalto zero). (We distinguish between the highest grade of oldest sibling
missingin the usual sense, and missing because the respondent istheoldest sibling.) Standard errors are
reported in parentheses.
2. SpecifIcationincli4es schooling andIts trend Interaction.